The design features ground, sustain and constrain visual experience of O. Specifically, I argue that a picture acts as a functional surrogate for O. I suggest that the recognition view should be supplemented by a view that explains visual experience. Additionally, I argue that recognition alone does not provide an adequate theory of depiction because it does not explain the visual experience characteristic of engagement with pictures. However, I don’t adopt his second condition which requires a causal connection between O and P.
I agree with his claim that a picture, P, depicts something, O, if and only if P is able to trigger the capacity for a suitable perceiver in suitable conditions to recognize an O by its appearance. To answer this question I defer, partially, to Dominic Lopes's recognition view. This definition of depiction sets up the central task for a theory of depiction: to explain how it is possible for a marked surface to facilitate a visual experience as of O.
I argue that P depicts O if the design of P visibly manifests O. Accordingly, I begin by defining depiction, and reject what I call the ``ambiguity view'' which holds that terms like ``depiction'' and ``representation'' are ambiguous. I begin by providing an account of depiction and then provide an account of communication and, specifically, pictorial communication. The primary goal of my dissertation is to reconcile an anti-intentionalist account of depiction with an intentionalist account of pictorial communication.
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